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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The Appellant Twylla Robinson (hereinafter, "Appellant") filed

Appeal on March 26,

2013, following the trial court's February 12,2013, Judgment on its February 6,2013, Memorandum
Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of

Respondent Connie Mueller, as

Personal Representative of the Estate of Hazel Marquardt (hereinafter, "Respondent"). R., Vol. I,
pp. 95 and 103. This decision of course derived from a premises liability (trip and fall) action
brought by the Appellant against the Respondent wherein the Appellant alleged that on September
6,2009, the Respondent breached a duty of care owed to the Appellant by allowing a dangerous
condition to exist in an apartment owned by the Respondent. R., Vol. I, pp. 7-10.
B. Course of the Proceedings
The Respondent concurs with the Appellant's statements regarding the course of the
proceedings.
C. Statement of Facts
1.

The premises at issue is a two story house located at 12 Cottonwood Drive, St.

Maries, Idaho. R., Vol. I, p. 96.
2.

The premises was constructed in 1915. R., VoL I, p. 32. This occurred twelve years

before the promulgation of the Uniform Building Code in 1927. Id. at p. 96.
3.
I,

The premises was purchased by Hazel Marquardt,

her husband, in 1973. R., Vol.

73 and 96.
4.

At the time of their purchase, the second floor consisted

an apartment that was

accessible from a separate entrance. R., Vol. I, pp. 35 and 97. Also, at the time of their purchase

1

the apartment had a door that lead out to a portion ofthe roof. Id. at pp. 33 and 97. This area is a
recessed dormer. Id at p. 33. The exterior dormer did not have railings.
5.

At the time of purchase

at

33 and 97.

1973, Benewah County, Idaho, had not yet adopted

Uniform Building Code. l R., VoL I, pp. 33 and 96. It did so a year later

1974. Id Thus, there

were no code requirements in effect at the time of purchase.
6.

From the time that Marquardt owned the premises

1973 to the time ofthe incident

of September 6, 2009, there had not been any remodels or structural changes that would compel a
building permit or compliance with any applicable code. R., Vol. I, pp. 33, 37 and 96. That is, the
house, including the recessed dormer and the absence of any railings, was grand-fathered in and
hence no railings were required. Id
7.

Meanwhile, in March, 2007, the subject apartment was rented to tenant Bryan

Winkelman, and he moved in on April 1,2007. R, Vol. I, pp. 41 and 97. At all times during his
tenancy, Winkelman knew that there were no railings surrounding the exterior dormer. Id. At no
during his tenancy did any structural changes occur to the exterior dormer or apartment. Id. at
pp. 42 and 97. At no time during his tenancy did he ever request railings or structural changes to the
exterior recessed dormer. Id. at pp. 43 and 97.
8.

In fact, Winkelman testified that he was warned by Marquardt about the absence of

railings when he moved in. R, Vol. I, pp. 38 and 97.

9.

On September 5, 2009, Winkelman met the

at a local bar

during the city's "Paul Bunyan Days" festival. R, VoL I, pp. 42 ili'1d 97.
hours of September 6, 2009, the Appellant retreated

St. Maries,
the early

Winkelman to his Cln"rlrYlPl'Y after

Uniform Building Code is now known as the International Building Code. R., VoL I, p. 37.
2

having consumed alcoholic beverages. !d. When they arrived, Winkelman opened the door to the
recessed dormer to let in cool air and enjoy the view. fd. at pp. 39,

and 97.

and Winkelman walked out onto the recessed dormer then returned inside.

fact,

Appellant

Winkelman said that

he told the Appellant not to go out onto the dormer and he left to retrieve an item from his car. fd.
at pp. 40, 42 and 97. While he was briefly gone, the Appellant \\Tapped herself in a blanket and
walked toward the recessed dormer. fd. at pp. 40 and 97. As she approached the doorway and began
to step out, the Appellant tripped, presumably over the blanket, landed on the recessed dormer, rolled
off the dormer and fell approximately 12 feet to the ground. fd. at pp. 40 and 97.
10.

At the time of the September 6,2009, incident, the premises was ovmed by Hazel

Marquardt. Ms. Marquardt passed away following the incident, and her daughter, Connie Mueller
is the Personal Representative of the Estate. R., Vol. I, p. 34.
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Whether the trial court erred in granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary

Judgment when defining the scope of the duty of care owed by a residential landlord to the social guest
of said landlord's tenant, and thereafter concluding that the Respondent did not breach the duty owed
in this instance.
B.

Whether this Court should award fees and costs to the Respondent.
IV. ARGUMENT

A.

.4.11
IS

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
court's standard of review of a lower court's decision on summary judgment

same standard applied by the lower court in ruling on the

Engineering,

v., 148 Idaho 89, 218 P.3d 1150 (2009), this Court
3

Vreeken v. Lockwood

When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court applies the same
standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for
summary judgment. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307,
160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter o flaw. " I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party
to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Cafferty v. Dep't o/Transp.,
Div. 0/ Motor Vehicle Servs., 144 Idaho 324, 327, 160 P.3d 763, 766 (2007). "If
there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question oflaw remains, over which
this Court exercises free review." Cristo, 144 Idaho at 307, 160 P.3d at 746 (quoting
Infanger v. City a/Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002)).

Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 101, 218 P.3d at 1162.
B.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY OF
CARE AND THEREAFTER DETERMINING THAT THE RESPONDENT DID
NOT BREACH SAID DUTY?
1.

Introduction.

The issue in this case regards the scope of the duty of care owed by a landlord to the social
guests of his or her tenants. Ifthis Court agrees with the trial court's analysis in defining the scope
of the duty of care, then based on the undisputed facts it is axiomatic that no duty was breached.
That said, "The existence of a duty is a question of law for" the court to decide. Harrigfeld v.

Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138,90 P.3d 884,888 (2004) (citing Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,
985 P.2d 669 (1999)).
In this instance, the trial court concluded that the duty owed by a landlord to a social guest
a tenant is

same as that duty which would be owed by the tenant to the social guest. R., Vol.

I, p. 99. In particular, the trial court said:
Had [the Appellant] sued [the tenant]
duty owed by [the tenant] would be that
owed to a licensee - a duty to inform about dangerous conditions which were k,'lovvn
and not reasonably discoverable by the social guest. It ma.kes no sense to impose a
higher duty of care [on the Respondent] ... than that owed by [the tenant] ....

4

*

*

*

*

*

[Thus,] the duty owed by [the Respondent] was to disclose to the lessee, [the tenant]
the condition of the porch area and the lack of handrails. The undisputed facts show
that [the Respondent] did so inform [the tenant]. It then became the duty of [the
tenant], as possessor ofthe property ... to disclose to [the Appellant] the condition
the porch area.
R., Vol. I, pp. 99 and 101-02.

sum, the trial court rejected the Appellant's request

a

heightened duty of care should be imposed on residential landlords, and also concluded that the
Respondent did not breach a duty of care under well established principles ofIdaho premises liability
law because she warned the guest, vis-a-vis the tenant, of the allegedly dangerous condition. R., Vol.
I, pp. 99 and 102.
Clearly, the Appellant disagreed with the trial court's decision, hence this appeal. However,
the basis of her disagreement is a misunderstanding of premises liability law in Idaho, including a
misunderstanding of this Court's decision in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984),
where she believes that the Stephens Court stands for the principle that a landlord owes the social
guest of a tenant a duty of reasonable care in the maintenance of premises; and, she suggests
that the Respondent breached a duty by failing to exercise reasonable care or even warning
Appellant. This is wrong. In the alternative, the Appellant contends that if Stephens does not stand
for this proposition, then this Court should broaden the scope of Stephens and essentially impose a
greater duty of care on a residential landlord in Idaho because there "is no good reason" not to. This
HLa.",-v'"

no sense, as will be discussed later in this Brief. Finally, the Appellant contends that
"catch-all" duty that every person owes a duty of care to prevent harm to others should
case.

.

IS

wrong

.

III

of the specific and defined duties of care incumbent

occupiers of land in Idaho.

5

2. Premises Liability Law in Idaho with Regard to a Licensee/Social Guest.
Before addressing the Appellant's contentions, a brief primer on the decades
development of premises liability law in Idaho with regard to licensees may be in order. As this
Court surely is aware, Idaho has clearly established the duties owed by an owner or by an occupier
of premises to an injured third persons. And, it begins with defining the status ofthe injured person.
Indeed, "The distinction between trespassers, licensees, and invitees is the controlling test in
determining the scope and extent of the duty of care owed by landowners to entrants. O'Guin v.
Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 14, 72 P.3d 849, 854 (2003). See also Holzheimer v. Johannesen,

125 Idaho 397, 399, 871 P.2d 814, 816 (1994)." Boots v. TVinters, 179 P.3d 352, 356, 145 Idaho
389,393 (Idaho App. 2008).
In this instance, there is no dispute that the Appellant was a licensee/social guest of the
tenant.

"A licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another 'with the consent of the

landovvTIer in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. Likewise, a social guest is also a licensee."
Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400,871 P.2d at 817.

With that, the "duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only required to share with
the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land." Id. Perhaps the Court in
Evans v. Park, ll2 Idaho 400, 732 P.2d 369 (Idaho App. 1987), said it best:
InKellerv. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 1112 (Ct.App.l~83), vacated
on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984), we summarized the standard
liability applicable to the instant case.

passive penmSSlOn or as a
A person who enters the property of another
mere social guest traditionally has been held to understand that he must take
land as the possessor uses it. This entrant, classified by the law as a
licensee, is expected to be alert and to protect himself from the risks he
encounters. Accordingly, the duty owed to a licensee with respect to such
6

risks is narrowly restricted. The possessor is required simply to share his
knowledge ofdangerous conditions or dangerous activities with the licensee.
When such a warning has been given, the possessor's knowledge is no longer
superior to that of the licensee, and the possessor's duty extends no farther .
... fd. at 652-53, 671 P.2d at 1115-16.
Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho at 401,732 P.2d at 370 (Idaho App. 1987) (emphasis added) (in Evans,
a decision that post-dated Stephens v. Stearns by three years, the plaintiff was a social guest at the
home ofthe defendant Park when plaintiff fell and suffered injury).
Seven years later the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed the duty owed by a possessor of land
toward a licensee/social guest in Holzheimer v. Johannesen, supra. There, the Holzheimer Court
recognized the distinction between invitees and licensees, stating that the possessor owes an invitee
a duty of reasonable care. fd. at 399-400, 871 P.2d at 816-17. However, the Holzheimer Court
stated that a possessor of the premises "is only required to share with the licensee knowledge of
dangerous conditions or activities on the land." fd. at 400,871 P.2d at 817 (emphasis added). Surely
the Holzheimer Court was aware of Stephens v. Stearns at the time yet did not broaden its holding
to include guests of tenants in the same category as an invitee as requested by the Appellant herein.
In fact, the distinction has been confirmed multiple times by the appellate courts of this State.

See, e.g., Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393, 179 P.3d 352,356 (App. 2008). Just last year the
Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that the duty owed to a person injured on the land is determined by
status of the person. See Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270
(2012). And,

doing so

Court affirmed that the occupant must only warn a licensee or social

guest of dangerous conditions.

7

In sum, when a person is injured upon the land of another, the focus of the trial court is to
determine the status of the injured party. lfthe injured person is an invitee, then the possessor
owes a duty of reasonable care. In Stephens v. Stearns, supra, as will be further

of the

discussed, the Idaho Supreme Court included tenants in the category of an invitee, stating that a
landlord owes his or her tenant a duty of reasonable care. Stephens, 106 Idaho at 257-58,678 P.2d
at 49-50. In Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 749 P.2d 486 (1988), the Court included employees
in the category of an invitee.
If, however, the injured person and claimant is a licensee/social guest, then the possessor "is
only required to share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land."

See Ball v. City ofBlackfoot, 152 Idaho at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270. See also Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho
at 401, 732 P.2d at 370 (possessor takes the land as he possesses it). That is premises liability law
in Idaho with regard to the duty owed to a licensee/social guest and it has not wavered.
With regard to whom the duty is beholden in the context of social guests to residential
property, leased or otherwise, Idaho law is clear on this issue, as well. Indeed, for purposes of which
party owes the duty, i.e., it is unquestionably the possessor of the land. See Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho
at 401, 732 P.2d at 370. That is, it is the occupier, not the O\vner and the occupier.
Indeed, in Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1
that a tenant steps into the shoes of the landlord
and is aware of the alleged dangerous condition.

the tenant is the occupier of the premises

at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329.

Court considered a claim where an injured third person sued the
CU.UHJJllH'vLlL

was an

for injuries.

1 (1989), the Court effectively

and o-vvner of a business
as opposed to

matter. Id. at 589-90, 768 P.2d at 1322-23. NotVvlthstanding, the Harrison

8

the

[A] tenant or lessee, having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third
parties are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of injury to third parties
occasioned by the condition or use ofthe premises, the general rule is that the tenant
or lessee may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair.

Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,596,768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).2 Cf, Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347 P.2d 341, 347 *1959) (the host owes the duty
of care). See also Ball v. City ofBlackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266,1270 (2012) ("[T]he
fact that a guest may be rendering a minor, incidental service to the host does not change the
relationship [between them as a landowner and a licensee] "') (emphasis added).
In Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676, 471 P.2d 63 (1970), the plaintiff there was a guest at
a house rented by the defendant Robinson when she slipped and fell down a flight of stairs. Id. at
677,471 P.2d at 64. The plaintiff sued the tenant Robinson, not the owner or landlord. And, the
Court affirmed the trial court's offered jury instructions, including the instruction which provided
that provided the occupier of the premises "he has a duty to warn the licensee of the condition or
otherwise obviate its risks." !d. at 678,471 P.2d at 65.
In sum, the case authority in Idaho is clear that the possessor or tenant

premises at issue

owes the licensee! social guest a duty to warn ofknmvn dangerous conditions because the tenant steps
into the shoes of the owner/landlord with regard to said dangerous conditions.
tenant is aware,

other words, if the

the tenant holds the duty to warn.

This makes sense and it conforms with the trial court's finding

instant matter that the

landlord was only required to disclose to the possessor, i.e., the tenant Winkelman in this instance,
any alleged dangerous conditions. It thereafter was

2See

possessor's

3.15 ("The owner [or] occupant owes a duty to warn a licensee ...

9

to disclose

adverse conditions to his social guest. See R., Vol. I, p. 101-02. In other words, the Respondent in
instant matter fulfilled her

by warning Winkelman.

3. Appellant's Misunderstanding: of Stephens v. Stearns, supra.
With that, the Appellant argues that the Court in Stephens v. Stearns, supra, "brought to an
end the old common law

of landlord immunity," and held that landlords are required to

"exercise reasonable care under the circumstances" toward all who come onto the property. See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10; see also Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho at 257, 678 P.2d at 49 (emphasis
added). This is where the Appellant errs. She reads the words, "under the circumstances" in
Stephens to mean "under all circumstances," regardless of the status of the injured person.

The Appellant mistakenly reads the Stephens decision as having eliminated the distinction
between injured third persons who come onto the property of another with respect to the duty owed.
Moreover, she mistakenly reads Stephens with regard to whom the duty is beholden when she argues
that the Respondent nonetheless failed to warn.
Stephens, as the Court knows, regarded a situation where a tenant was injured due to the

condition of the property. Stephens, 106 Idaho at 252,678 P.2d at 44. The Stephens decision was
therefore limited to the circumstances in Stephens and the status of the tenant. That is, whether the
tenant was an invitee or a

Stephens did not consider the status of a social guest of a tenant. 3

3To further illustrate that the Stephens holding was germane to only the circumstances involving the
duty owed by a landlord to
tenant, the Court considered the implied warranty of habitability owed
by a landlord to his or her tenant, and not the guest of a tenant, under Idaho Code § 6-320, stating,
"Our embracement of this rule is further supported by our legislature's enactment of a statutory
version ofthe implied warranty of habitability, I.C. § 6-320." Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho at 258,
n. 3,678 P.2d at 50, n. 3 (citation omitted). Indeed, a guest ofa tenant does not have standing to sue
a landlord under I.C. § 6-320. That statute requires that a "tenant may file an action against a
landlord for damages and specific performance for ... [m]aintaining the premises in a manner
hazardous to the health or safety of the tenant." Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 73, 233 P.3d 1,4
10

its holding that a landlord owes his or her tenant a duty of reasonable care. Stephens, 106
Idaho at 257-58,678 P.2d at 49-50. 4
More importantly for purposes oftms matter, at no time did the Stephens Court, or the Sharp
Court

that matter, discuss and expand the scope of the duty owed to a social guest

a tenant.

is, neither Stephens nor Sharp eliminated the traditional status of a licensee. Rather, those
Courts simply expanded the definition of an invitee to include the tenant of a landlord, but did not
include the guests of tenants. The reason was to conform with I.C. § 6-320. See, supra, n. 4.
Unfortunately, the Appellant refuses to read Stephens, as well as Sharp, in the context it was
intended, i.e., to reconcile with Idaho Code § 6-320, and continues to believe that in light of Stephens
a landlord owes all individuals who come onto the property, regardless of status, a duty of reasonable
care. Not only is this an unsupported and expansive stretch of the Stephens holding, it is completely
illogical in light of decades of decisions developing premises liability law in Idaho with regard to
the distinction between the status of the injured person and relative duties owed. 5

(2008). However, the statute only applies to an action brought by the tenant. Not a third party. Id.
at 74, 233 P .3d at 5. Thus, the decision in Stephens to include tenants in the category of an invitee
was to square with legislative intent.
4In Sharp v. Moore, 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990), the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed
Stephens v. Stearns, supra, holding that a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care to the tenant
his or her property. Id. at 300, 796 P.2d at 509. The Court did not say that a landlord also owes
same duty to the guests of the tenant.
Appellant also misreads and disregards the Respondent's arguments and the trial
findings when she argues at page 19 of Appellant's opening Brief that "[i]fthe Stephens rule
not apply to tenant's guests, [Respondent] would have no duty to [the Appellant] not even a
to warn .... " This is incorrect. As stated, the landlord/oVvTIer owes a duty to warn licensees
a
dangerous condition. Here, the Respondent did so by informing the tenant Winkelman. In light
the decisions in Evans and Harrison, the tenant, as the possessor of the premises with knowledge
of the condition, therefore was "deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to be the ovmer. .. " and
stepped into the shoes of the Respondent. Evans, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370; Harrison, 115
11

Likewise, the Appellant's reliance on a concurring opinion in Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho
867, 749 P.2d 486 (1988), is misplaced. To refresh, in Marcher, the injured party plaintiff was an
of the tenant and sued the landlord/defendant. Id. at 868, 749 P.2d at 487. The injured
party was not a social guest. Again, an employee is on the premises for a business purpose and is
more akin to an invitee. This is a clear distinction

a social guest.

In fact, the Marcher Court noted the same and said that the employee was tantamount to an
invitee and should be treated as an invitee. The reason is because "an employee will proceed to
encounter the dangerous condition in order to keep his or her job. In the present case the plaintiff was
performing duties on the second floor of the condominium at the request of the tenant." !d. at 871,
749 P.2d at 490.
With that, the Marcher Court stated that the correct standard to apply to the circumstance
where an employee is injured is that "a lessor may be liable to an invitee/employee who suffered
injuries proximately caused by unsafe condition of the premises even though the danger is obvious
and known to such invitee." Id. at 871, 749 P.2d at 490 (emphasis added).
In sum, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals have expanded the definition of invitee
to include socials guests of a residential tenant.

duty owed remains a duty to warn the social
on the land." See Ball v. City ofBlackfoot,

guest, or licensee, of "dangerous conditions or
152 Idaho at 677, 273 P.3d at 1270. Moreover,
owed to

social

property. To the contrary, it is
O\vner, who is

at

appellate courts ofIdaho have not held that the

is beholden

anyone other

host, or person

to

768 P.2d at 1329.
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the possessor

residential

possession of

premises deemed to be

or her knowledge

dangerous conditions.

See also Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d at 347, Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho at 401, 732
at 370, and Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329.
Perhaps realizing there are no cases in Idaho which

Appellant's position, she turns

case authority from New Hampshire, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts. However, cases
those jurisdictions have no bearing or weight in the State ofIdaho. And, more importantly, the
'-'~L""",V

courts ofIdaho surely were aware of those relatively old cases when it issued its decisions

Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 732 P.2d 369 (App. 1987), Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho
871 P.2d 814 (1994), and Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,596,768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989),
among others.
Of course, as noted, the Evans, Holzheimer, and Harrison line of cases all provide that the
possessor of property must only share with the guest his or her knowledge of dangerous conditions.
And, they all held that the possessor of property steps into the shoes of the owner of the property,
and is deemed to be the owner with regard to the duty owed by to an invitee, licensee, social guest
or trespasser so long as the possessor knows of the existing hazard.
In sum, the law in Idaho is well established. First, the trial court is to determine the status
ofthe person injured. Here, the Appellant was a social guest. That is undisputed. The next step for
trial court is to determine the scope of the duty owed.

noted, the duty owed to a

guest

is to warn said guest of known dangerous conditions. This may not be disputed under the current
state of the law

Idaho. Here, the

court found that the

owed to the Appellant was to warn

of any dangerous conditions. R., Vol. I, p. 99.
The third step for the trial court is to

""'-",vB,CLLLj' ....

who owes the duty to

this goes without saying as it is the one who has control of the premises who owes the duty.
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See Boots ex reI. Boots v. TiVinters, 179 P.3d at 356, 145 Idaho at 399 (premises liability focuses on
one who has control of the premises.) However, the Appellant has made this an issue.
or one who

as clearly noted, Idaho law clearly provides that the possessor of

control, owes a duty to warn a social guest of hazards that were known to the possessor, and not
reasonably discoverable by the social guest. The final step

of course,

the trial court or a jury

to determine whether the duty was fulfilled.
based on the undisputed facts, the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from
same is that the Respondent fulfilled her duty, i.e., she did not breach a duty of care. Indeed,
tenant in the instant matter, Winkelman, was the sole occupier and there is no dispute that
Winkelman was warned of the alleged dangerous condition by the Respondent. R., Vol. I, p. 101.
Moreover, Winkelman, as possessor of the premises with knowledge of the alleged dangerous
condition, was "deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to be the owner... " and hence stepped
into the shoes of the Respondent. Therefore, the Respondent fulfilled her duty to warn as she
informed Winkelman of the alleged dangerous condition. That is all that was required of her and
nothing else under Idaho law. Meaning, she did not breach a duty of care.
At

juncture, Winkelman, as the occupant and possessor, had the duty to warn the
of the alleged dangerous condition. R., Vol. I,

carry out a
L

Whether Winkelman extended the warning or not is a matter between Winkelman

",,'fJ"'UULLL.

However, since the Respondent fulfilled

Respondent from
It is
bet,veen

101-02. Noone else was required to

case.
corltmues to mlsurLderst,m

it is
status of injured persons for

Appellant has

to

trial court nrrw,p,-I

in Idaho. In fact,

one case in Idaho where a possessor of residential property owes a social
14

guest a duty of reasonable care. She cannot because it does not exist. Moreover, the Appellant has
failed to point to once case where a residential1andlord can be held liable even after fulfilling his
or

duty to warn of a dangerous condition on the property.
Ifthe Appellant's position were the law and residential landlords had to warn every guest of

a tenant about any dangerous conditions, even though said landlord already warned the tenant of the
same, then landlords would be liable for the tenant's negligence in every instance. Including the
instance where the

CvH,,,-HC,

who was previously infonned of a condition by the landlord, failed to

disclose said condition to guests. In other words, under the Appellant's rationale, the landlord
becomes an ultimate insurer irregardless of the tenant's duty. Frankly, under the Appellant's
rationale, it is tantamount to strict liability. That is, because a guest was injured then the landlord
is liable because whether there was a breach of duty is irrelevant. This would be contradictory to the
law of Idaho as well as public policy because it would place a inconceivably costly and onerous
burden on landlords. For example, landlords would be compelled to pay for increased insurance and
pass those costs onto the tenants, many of whom cannot afford the same; and, it would essentially
render meaningless renter's insurance.
Nonetheless, under the law in this State, the Respondent respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the trial court's findings below that the Appellant was only entitled to
dangerous condition, that the Respondent did in fact warn the tenant of the
condition and

"'''to'Trp'C>

instance, i.e.,
4.

U.H'VF,~''-'

the tenant owed the Appellant the duty of care. In sum,

requests that this Court affinn the trial court's finding that
the Respondent did not breach a
General Dutv of Care.
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Respondent fulfilled
care.

warned of a
dangerous

Respondent
duty of care

The Appellants's final argument also does not comport with Idaho law.

Appellant

argues that the Respondent may be liable because the Respondent owed a general duty to act
reasonable care under all circumstances. This, as the Court knows, is the "balancing
approach." It is not applicable

the instant matter. See Boots ,,: Winters, 145 Idaho 389,

179

P.3d 352, 357 (Idaho App. 2008) ("We engage in a balancing of the harm only in those rare
situations when we are called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed or when
a duty has not previously been recognized.")6 Here, the appellate courts of this state have defined
the duties owed to invitees, licensees/social guests, and trespassers with regard to hazardous
conditions. To accept Appellant's position would render Idaho premises liability law meaningless.'
C.

Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal.

On appeal, the Respondent requests attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and LA.R. 41 on the
basis that the Appellant brought this appeal simply to second guess the trial court and as such said
appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. See Rendon v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944,
945,894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct.App.1995). Fmiher, the Respondent requests costs under LA.R. 40.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the District Court's February 6, 2013, Memorandum Opinion and
Order and its February 12,2013, Judgment

the

matter because the Appellant has failed to

6The reason the Boots Court discussed the "balancing of
approach to
because Boots was not a premises liability case involving the physical condition
179 P.3d at 356.

UvJeULJ.Hl",

a duty is
at 393,

turns to Sharp v. Ala are , 118 Idaho 297,
506 (1990) for
misplaced reliance because while the Sharp Court generally addressed the balancing
approach, it did so by analogy to establish
reasons
a
owes an invitee a duty of
reasonable care. Id at 301, 796 P.2d at 510.
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demonstrate that the District Court based its Decision and the subsequent Judgment on an erroneous
conclusion of law, or that it abused its discretion

applying the applicable law. Moreover,

Court should sustain the conclude that the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order was
sufficiently based in law and fact. Finally,
incurred

Respondent requests &'1 award of fees and costs and

defending this Appeal.

DATED this

K

day of <err

,2013.

I
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Micliael L. ~he Finn
Attorneys for Respondent
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